Analysis: Saudis Seek Illusory “Third Way” in Regional Diplomacy

By Jonathan Spyer *

January 17, 2010

http://www.gloria-center.org/Gloria/2010/01/-saudis-seek

Syrian President Bashar Assad is reportedly scheduled to visit the Saudi capital Riyadh, where he is to meet with Saudi King Abdullah. The meeting is rumored to be a prelude to a three way summit also to involve Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. The current round of talks is the latest stage in Syria’s return from the cold in terms of its reintegration – on its own terms and with no concessions made – into the mainstream of Arab diplomacy. This process, in turn, is testimony to the current weakness of Saudi Arabia’s position.

The two traditional lynchpins of the modern Arab state order – Egypt and Saudi Arabia – today find themselves in an uncomfortable position. The key regional strategic process taking place is the contest between the United States, Israel and their allies on the one hand, and the Islamic Republic of Iran and its clients on the other. This clash between non-Arab-led forces has effectively broken apart the traditional patterns of Arab diplomacy, with Arab states engaged on either side. This split has been perhaps most glaringly – and for the Arabs most embarrassingly – apparent in the Arab-Israeli arena.

During Operation Cast Lead, the Arab League was unable even to assemble a quorum in order to condemn Israel’s actions. This was because the split in the Palestinian camp had in effect produced two Palestinian national movements, one aligned with the pro-Iranian regional camp (Hamas), and the other associated with the pro-Western camp. In Operation Cast Lead, Israel went to war with the pro-Iranian Palestinian element.

The Saudis are frightened of the Iranian regime. They are also deeply uncomfortable with a situation in which the great legitimating flag of Islamic and regional opposition to Israel is passing into the hands of the Iranians. They are therefore seeking to re-absorb the two Arab elements who have drawn closest to Teheran – Syria and the Palestinian Islamists – back into the fold of Arab diplomacy.

There is a fatal flaw in the Saudi design. The flaw is Riyadh’s weakness. The Saudis can only seek to tempt. They cannot insist, much less coerce. What they wish to present as rapprochement thus ends up looking more like surrender to the pro-Iranian camp.

So since October, Riyadh has been hard at work on the Syrians. The main policy result of this so far has been the foundation of a new government in Lebanon. The new government in Lebanon became possible because the clients of Saudi Arabia conceded the demands of the pro-Iranian, pro-Syrian element in their entirety, following five months of inconsequential bargaining.

The leaders of the new government have since made supplicatory trips to Damascus. They are pledged not to disturb the independent pro-Iranian military force in the country (Hizbullah.)

Riyadh now appears to be trying to perform something similar on the Palestinian track. A flurry of diplomacy is under way. Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal met with the Syrian president in Damascus. Assad on that occasion stressed to Mashaal the importance of Palestinian unity.

The Saudis are subsequently known to have encouraged Abbas to meet with Mashaal in Damascus.It is not yet clear what exactly the Saudis are driving at. But Saudi Arabia’s current actions are the latest proof that Syria’s policy of disruption works – at least against weak and irresolute enemies. While holding fast to their alliance with the Iranians, and in return for nothing, the Syrians have been invited back to the top table of Arab diplomacy. This, the Saudis hope, will allow for the noble task of trying to put Humpty together again – that is, rebuilding Arab regional diplomacy along the comforting lines of all-together-against-Israel (at least verbally).

The problem with all this is that it won’t work. If the Saudis or anyone else believe that the pro-Iranian alliance can be stopped in its tracks by handing it victory, they are sorely mistaken. The result of surrender in Lebanon has not been to restore “normality” to that country – it has been to place it firmly back into the Syrian/Iranian orbit.

It is in any case not at all certain that the senior partner (the Iranians) are interested in Palestinian reunification. The Iranians want to control the frontlines of conflict between Israelis and Islamic forces, as they see it. They currently control fronts to Israel’s north (Lebanon) and south (Gaza). It is difficult to see why they would allow one of these to be ceded.

But in any case, current Saudi actions have the feel of an attempt to turn the clock back – to a time when the Arabs could unite in happy inactivity around declarations of support for the Palestinians. Iran’s regional ambitions have ended all that, and have produced new and unfamiliar patterns of pragmatic alignment.

These are the products of a reality which shows no sign of changing substantially any time soon. In the Middle East today there is the US-led alliance and the Iran-led alliance. There is no third, Arab way. Offering up gifts to Iran’s chief Arab partners, meanwhile, will serve not to satiate the Iran-led bloc, but rather to whet its appetite.

*Dr. Jonathan Spyer is a senior research fellow at the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, Herzliya, Israel

Arab World: Battleground Yemen

By Jonathan Spyer *

January 12, 2010

http://www.gloria-center.org/Gloria/2010/01/arab-world-yemen

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently described the current situation in Yemen as “a threat to regional stability and even to global stability.” She was referring to the fact that Yemen is the latest failed state to become a haven for elements of the Sunni global jihad. Like Afghanistan and Sudan before it, Yemen is becoming a key regional base for al-Qaida.

Unlike in the other two countries, in Yemen this has come about not because of an agreement reached between the jihadis and the authorities; rather, the inability of the Yemeni authorities to impose their rule throughout their country, coupled with the close proximity of Yemen to Saudi Arabia – a key target for al-Qaida – has made the country a tempting prospect for the terrorists.

Al-Qaida is not the only major problem facing Yemen. In fact, it could be argued that the country manages to encapsulate in acute form the three main causes of political turmoil in the Middle East: a dictatorial government, vulnerability to Iranian subversion through local jihadis and the presence and activity of the Sunni global jihad.

Last January, the hitherto little-heard-of Yemeni franchise of al-Qaida merged with the Saudi franchise to form the so-called “al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula” (AQAP). The Saudi jihadis were facing an increasingly effective counterterror campaign by the Saudi authorities, and therefore decided to shift focus to lightly-governed Yemen, where proper security fails to extend much beyond the capital city of San’a.

Through its organizing of the failed attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253, AQAP has now entered the major leagues of the global jihad. Fears of an imminent second strike led to temporary closure of the US, British and French embassies in San’a over the last week.

YEMEN IS currently host to no less than three separate insurgencies. Each resembles one another in that they are being conducted by forces committed to some form of political Islam. There, however, the similarities end.

Probably the most politically and militarily significant of the three Islamist insurgencies is that of the Houthi rebels in the Saada district in the north. The Zaidi Shi’ite rebels of the al-Houthi clan have been engaged in an insurgency against the Yemeni authorities since 2004. Quelling the uprising has proved quite beyond the capabilities of the government of Ali Abdalla Saleh.

In the past few months, the Shi’ite Houthis have extended their activities across the border to Saudi Arabia. Their close proximity to the Saudi border makes them a useful tool for Iran to pressure Riyadh. Responding to rebel attacks in November, the Saudis struck back with aircraft and helicopter gunships, killing around 40 Houthis. Regardless, Iran is sending regular arms shipments to the Houthis, continuing to stoke the flames of the rebellion. The real possibility of further deterioration remains.

The second insurgency faced by the hapless Yemeni regime is a separatist campaign in the south. Yemen was only reunified in 1990, and has since suffered a brief civil war in 1994. The separatist insurgency, led by Islamist tribal leader Tareq al-Fadhli, again grew in intensity during 2009, with a number of stormy demonstrations and armed confrontations leading to deaths on both sides.

As if fighting insurgencies on two separate fronts was not enough, Yemen is also being hit hard by economic woes. The country’s steadily depleting oil reserves are unable to generate sufficient income for the government to maintain the tribal patronage system on which it depends. Gas exports are failing to make up the shortfall. And Yemen’s water supplies are also dwindling.

Like a parasite that spots, enters and exploits a weakening body, AQAP has now added its own particular brand of Islamist insurgency to this volatile situation.

The close proximity of Yemen to Saudi Arabia and to international shipping lanes makes the country’s instability a factor which the US and the West cannot afford to ignore.

This, however, raises a dilemma. The regime of President Ali Saleh is autocratic, inefficient and largely ineffectual. Its economic policies have failed to develop the country, leaving the regime sitting precariously on top of a boiling cauldron of poverty, illiteracy, extremism and discontent. To remain on its perch, the regime is now asking for ever larger contributions of US funding and assistance to counter the terror.

Since Yemen’s government rules in name only in large parts of the country, increasing the US commitment to combating al-Qaida in the country raises the possibility of US ground forces in Yemen. President Barack Obama can ill afford yet another Middle East war, with its inevitable cost in American lives. Yet he also cannot afford to stand back and allow Yemen to play the role for al-Qaida that Afghanistan played in the late 1990s.

There are no simple answers. Washington may prefer to adopt the counterterror tactic of helping the Yemenis strike al-Qaida sites from the air, to avoid the sight of US soldiers deployed in a country so close to the Muslim holy city of Mecca.

But whichever option the US chooses, the real “root cause” of the proliferating insurgencies in Yemen, and the inability of the regime to adequately deal with them, is the ongoing dysfunctionality of the region’s political culture. All across the Middle East, failing, autocratic regimes face off against popular Islamist movements committed to a murderous and ultimately sterile political program.

Yemen offers an example of this situation in a particularly virulent form.

*Dr. Jonathan Spyer is a senior research fellow at the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, Herzliya, Israel

Iran Hasn’t Won the Cold War Yet

By Jonathan Spyer *

January 7, 2010

http://www.gloria-center.org/Gloria/2010/01/iran-hasn%27t

The salient strategic fact in the Middle East today is the Iranian drive for regional hegemony. This Iranian objective is being promoted by a rising hardline conservative elite within the Iranian regime, centred on a number of political associations and on the Iranian Revolutionary Guards corps.

This elite, which is personified by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has received the backing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Their aim is a second Islamic revolution that would revive the original fire of the revolution of 1979. They appear to be aiming for the augmenting of clerical rule with a streamlined, brutal police-security state, under the banner of Islam. Building Iranian power and influence throughout the Middle East is an integral part of their strategy.

The Iranian nuclear program is an aspect of this ambition.

A nuclear capability is meant to form the ultimate insurance for the Iranian regime as it aggressively builds its influence across the region.

This goal of hegemony is being pursued through the assembling of a bloc of states and organisations under Iranian leadership. This bloc, according to Iran, represents authentic Muslim currents within the region, battling against the US and its hirelings. The pro-Iranian bloc includes Syria, Sudan, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas among the Palestinians, and the Houthi rebel forces in northern Yemen.

A de facto rival alliance is emerging, consisting of states that are threatened by Iran and its allies and clients. This rival alliance includes Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait.

Israel, despite lacking official diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, is also a key member of this camp. Unlike the pro-Iranian bloc, which has a simple guiding ideology of resistance to the West, the countries seeking to counter Iran are united by interest only.

The rivalry between these two camps now informs and underlies all-important developments in the Middle East. It is behind the joint Israeli-Egyptian effort to contain the Iran-sponsored Hamas enclave in the Gaza Strip. It is behind the fighting in north Yemen, as Saudi troops take on Shia rebels armed and supported by Iran. The rivalry is behind the face-off between pro-American and pro-Iranian forces in Lebanon. The insurgencies in Afghanistan and in Iraq are also notable for the presence of weaponry traceable to Iran in use by insurgents against Western forces.

Who is winning in this ongoing Middle East cold war? The rhetoric of the Iranians, of course, depicts their advance as unstoppable. The reality is more complex, and the past year has seen gains and losses for both sides.

First, within Iran the electoral victory of Ahmadinejad and the subsequent backing given to him by Khamenei represented a major advance for the Iranian hardline conservatives. Ahmadinejad subsequently confirmed his victory by forming a cabinet that is packed with conservatives and Revolutionary Guardsmen.

But the refusal of large sections of the Iranian people to accept the possibly rigged election and the unprecedented scenes of opposition in the streets of Iranian cities in recent weeks have severely tarnished this achievement.

The ongoing unrest in Iran probably does not constitute an immediate danger to the regime. But it surely indicates that large numbers of Iranians have no desire to see their country turned into the instrument of permanent Islamic revolution and resistance envisaged by the hardline conservatives. The domestic unrest thus hits significantly at the emerging regime’s legitimacy, and their ability to promote their regime as a model for governance to the Arab and wider Muslim world.

Iran made major advances in Lebanon last year. The formation of the new Lebanese government in November in essence confirms Hezbollah’s domination of the country. Hezbollah is the favoured child of the Iranian regime and its partner in subversive activity globally. There is now no serious internal force in Lebanon able to oppose its will.

In Gaza, the Iranian-sponsored Hamas regime is holding on. The Iranian investment is central to Hamas’s ability to stay in power. The movement just announced a budget of $US540 million ($590m) for 2010. Of this, just $US55m is to be raised through taxes and local sources of revenue. The rest is to come from “aid and assistance”. Hamas does not reveal the identity of its benefactors. But it is fairly obvious that the bulk of this funding will come from Iran. The Palestinian issue remains the central cause celebre of the Arab and Muslim world. The Iranian regime’s goal is to take ownership of it.

But there have been setbacks here too. The Iranian resistance model failed in a straight fight with the Israeli Defence Forces in the early part of the year. Hamas’s 100-man “Iranian unit” suffered near destruction in Gaza. The Hamas regime in Gaza managed to kill six IDF soldiers in the entire course of Operation Cast Lead. This is a failure, recorded as such by all regional observers.

In addition, someone or the other appears to be trying to demonstrate to the Iranians that the use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy is a two-way street. Hence the killing of 29 Revolutionary Guards in a bombing in October near the Iran-Pakistan border, and the mysterious explosion in Damascus last month that killed a number of Iranian pilgrims.

So at the beginning of 2010, the lines are clearly drawn in the Middle East cold war, and the contest is far from over.

Ultimately, like other totalitarians before them, the Iranian hardline conservatives are likely to fail through overreach. The inefficient, corruption-ridden and oppressive state they are coming to dominate is likely to prove an insufficient instrument to sustain their boundless ambition. Still, this process probably has a long way to run yet. Much will depend on the sense of purpose, will and resourcefulness of the Western and regional countries that this regime has identified as its enemies.

This is a contest for the future of the region. It has almost certainly not yet reached its height.

*Dr. Jonathan Spyer is a senior research fellow at the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, Herzliya, Israel

New Strategy: Tempts Obama Administration with Instant Peace if it Pressures Israel

By Barry Rubin*

December 29, 2009

http://www.gloria-center.org/blog/2009/12/palestinian-authority-sets

We now have Mahmoud Abbas’s answer regarding short-term Palestinian Authority (PA) strategy. He says that if Israel stops all construction now-in Jerusalem and the 3000 apartments being completed-and accepts in advance the 1967 borders and there will be peace within six months. This is the basic story we’ve been hearing since around 1988: one or more Israeli concessions and everyone will live happily ever after.

This is clearly bait being dangled for President Barack Obama, offering him an “easy” way out of his dilemma of not having any peace talks after almost a year in office: pressure Israel to give up more and you will look good, with plenty of photo opportunities of you presiding over Israel-PA talks.

Of course, what Abbas wants to do is to remove one of the main points of Israeli leverage, the borders to be agreed upon and the status of east Jerusalem. Moreover, is leaving out both the additional demands he will be demanding (all Palestinians who want to can go live in Israel) and all the Israeli demands he will be ignoring (recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, the end of the conflict and dropping all Palestinian claims, security guarantees, an unmilitarized Palestinian state, settling all refugees in Palestine).

In addition, of course, he can’t speak for about half the people and territory he claims to represent, that is, the Gaza Strip. And by not holding elections and unilaterally extending his term, Abbas leaves the door open for some future Palestinian leadership saying he had no legitimate mandate to negotiate and therefore any agreement he made isn’t binding.

Finally, he made one very big misstatement of fact, hoping-as usual-that the West pays no attention to what’s said in Arabic. He claims that the PA has stopped incitement against Israel, in terms of urging violence and rejecting Israel’s existence. While the PA is, of course, far better than Hamas on such matters, a very large dossier can be compiled on how that is a lie.

The question is what will the Obama Administration do? Is it going to press Israel for still more unilateral concessions so that the PA will come to talks and President Obama can claim a success? Will it try to get the PA to do something in terms of confidence-building measures or to talk without preconditions? Israel is certainly not going to accept the 1967 borders with absolutely no change before even talking with the PA (and probably not even as part of a peace agreement).

Indeed, it is now Obama administration policy that there need to be minor border modifications to accommodate the post-1967 changes on the ground. Moreover, Israel can say that if it stops all construction immediately, including in Jerusalem, the PA still won’t talk so what’s the point?

Incidentally, Abbas admitted that he never asked for an Israeli construction freeze before but is only doing so in the context of the Roadmap Plan. However, even after the Road Map, Abbas never made this a big issue until after Obama demanded the construction freeze. In objective terms, the president has no one to blame but himself for this mess, but of course he isn’t going to blame himself. He has to blame either Israel or the PA. Which will it be?

How the Auschwitz Sign Claiming that “Work Makes Free” Embodies Current Western Thinking and Policy

By Barry Rubin*

The theft and then recovery of the famous sign at the entrance of Auschwitz-Arbeit macht frei, work will make you free-has brought that artifact of the Holocaust to international attention once again. Merely dismissing the sign as “cynical,” few understand the meaning of the sign in context and its underlying implications for Jewish thought and Israel today.

At the time–and this was very clear in Eastern European towns like that of my grandparents in Poland– Jews were used by the Germans for forced labor. While many were involved in road repair (an extremely important task during the war when highways were heavily used by the Nazis for military purposes), tree cutting, or other manual labor, others labored in their usual professions.

The Germans, of course, wanted to win the war, which they were waging, despite their victories, against difficult odds. Even after the French were defeated and the British retreated across the Channel, the combat was ferocious against the Soviets and the United Kingdom fought on. In pragmatic terms, the Germans needed Jewish labor. After all, too, they could hardly be receiving it under better circumstances. The Jews were not paid for the work, they were denied consumer goods, and their food rations were minimal.

In short, the German strategy toward the Jews-focusing on forced labor-made sense in pragmatic terms. And Western civilization is governed by pragmatism. One does what is beneficial to one’s material self-interests. The German behavior made sense.

It was not hard to explain, for the overwhelming majority of the Jews under German occupation as well, the killings of Jews that they knew about. Here, it was a reprisal for Germans killed by partisans; there, it was a pure act of cruelty or the deeds of a sadistic officer. Or it could be perceived by the pragmatic German goal of keeping the Jews intimidated or to appeal to local anti-Semitic Christians themselves under occupation or actions against Jews who were known for anti-Nazi views.

Whatever it seems to those looking back from a time of much greater knowledge, this pragmatic understanding did make sense in terms of all past history (including Jewish history) and the events people knew about. True, Hitler had written about the extermination of the Jews but this was considered to be just ideology. In Western society, people had become cynical about ideology or at least of ideas that went against immediate self-interest. This was just rabble-rousing.

Thus, it could be expected that if Jews really did work hard and did not cause too much trouble, they would survive, at least the great majority, as had happened during so many previous persecutions. That was their life experience and their historical experience. Of course, it was richly supplemented by wishful thinking, sometimes a wishful thinking that promoted blindness to events that were clearly visible, but this line of reasoning gave an ample logical basis to that wishful thinking.

And so, work makes free. It was not just a sarcastic act of derision but an actual control measure. If the Jews believed they were in Auschwitz to work hard in exchange for their lives, they would be more docile and far easier to manage. The sentiment was meant to be taken seriously, and almost always, at least until late in the war, it was.

To understand all of this is of vital importance for historical reasons. The Jews who became victims were not just cowards or fools or sheep but people who often believed they were using their wits to survive once again a terrible but ultimately passing pogrom. No matter how much they were starved or mistreated, they could take the hunger and put up with the beatings with the confidence that one day this, too, would end. Of course, they often had no choice and they wanted to believe this, yet it was quite rational for them to do so, certainly before the middle of 1942.

At this point, I hesitate to continue. The analogy of the Holocaust has been too often used, and misused. Moreover, many will think that I gratuitously or lightly exaggerate what I’m about to say. But consider this explanation seriously and you will better understand our own era.

The key here is the Western obsession with pragmatism, the dismissal of ideology, and the wishful thinking that believes conflict can be negotiated away or at least whittled down to the tolerable level by patience and concession. These were also the fundamental ideas that motivated both most European Jews and the expectations of most Western leaders and observers regarding the treatment of the Jews during the war (and in many cases, German intentions before the war as well). This mode of thinking is still very much with us.

Thus, it is disbelieved that radical Islamists, and in many cases militant Arab nationalists or various others, really mean what they say. Instead, it is expected that they will act according to narrow and individual personal interests. They would rather be rich than right, or revolutionary. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, architect of Iran’s Islamist revolution, derided this concept as thinking the revolution was made for the sake of lowering the price of watermelons.

Western deception and self-deception is also reinforced by the fact that the main contemporary experience in this regard has been with a tired and cynical Communism, long bereft of its revolutionary fire. It was well symbolized by a Soviet regime that was mainly interested in self-aggrandizement and staying in power. This was followed by the dealings with a Chinese Communist regime which seemed to be fanatically revolutionary but later settled down to making money and avoiding trouble abroad. The answer to Khomeini was the statement of Deng Xiaoping, the architect of that turn, who expressed the following view of ideology: “It doesn’t matter if a cat is black or white as long as it catches mice.” One can argue, with some justification, that after fifty years this has happened to Arab nationalism.

So, yes, revolutions do moderate, get tired, and settle down to redecorating with expensive furnishings. This is precisely the fate that the current Iranian regime is struggling to prevent for itself. Then there is the belief that the Supreme Being is guiding their steps. Then there is the belief of the Islamists-both pro- and anti-Iran ones–that they haven’t been trying that long and will win eventually. And the belief that their enemies are weak and close to surrender while they have such secret weapons as suicide bombing and soon nuclear weapons.

While, then, it is easy to believe that they don’t really mean what they say, that they would never do anything “anti-pragmatic” this is not likely to be true, at least not unless they are contained for many decades first. Or if they perceive they have failed or been defeated, which generally is nowhere near happening. Does Syria’s regime prefer Western aid to an alliance with Iran? Will Iran be responsible in its use of nuclear weapons? Is Hamas or Hizballah eager to be moderate? Are the Palestinians on the verge of making peace with Israel? Can American dollars buy off the Taliban in Afghanistan?

The answer that appeals to most Western leaders and intellectuals to all these questions is “yes.” After all, “they” must be just like “us” and it is allegedly arrogant or even racist to think otherwise. Needless to say, the Germans were much more like the Americans or British yet what happened did indeed happen. To put it bluntly, ideology and demagogic leadership turned the lovers of Mozart into the builders of Auschwitz.

It is easier, less painful, a much quicker solution that makes the problem go away. Underlying those thoughts, however, is the idea that they must not believe their own ideology and that they wouldn’t do anything that went against their interests or material well-being.

Let me underline the point here. I am not saying that radical Islamists or Arab nationalists or those holding various other extreme ideologies today are “fascist” or “Nazi.” That is simplistic, not credible, and misleading in its own way. They have their own history, world view, ideology, and goals. But they also have certain specific things in common: an ideology they really believe; profound genocidal hatred of others; readiness to sacrifice on behalf of these principles; and a profound belief they will win even though their enemies think this is ridiculous.

Of course, the Germans lost World War Two and their anti-pragmatism hastened that defeat. This, too, is worth keeping in mind. That is a factor to be used in the setting of strategy by democratic states and in the thinking of their people. Assuming they will act in the opposite way will not, however, strengthen that resistance.

Yet the greatest threat to the West of all is the mistaken belief that if we are really polite and avoid giving offense, that if we make concessions or work really hard we will be free of their threat.  We have set up our own signs at the entrances to our universities and foreign ministries that are the precise equivalent of Arbeit macht frei.

Why All the Excuses for Palestinian Intransigence Don’t Make Sense

It has occurred to me that many on the left seem oblivious to what should be one of their major concerns, the Arab attempts to destroy the Jewish State. Professor Rubin is one of the foremost experts on the Arab-Israeli  conflict.

Michael

By Barry Rubin

The Arab-Israeli, or Israel-Palestinian, conflict is the most misrepresented subject in the entire world. The most basic facts are often distorted and the most fantastical of narratives provided, even in college classrooms, about what has actually happened.

On the most single important issue in this framework-why isn’t there peace, who wants and doesn’t want peace, and how can peace be achieved-there is a common set of arguments against Israel. It goes like this:

How can the Palestinians make peace when they are suffering so much and when Israel builds settlements, or Israeli leaders make statements saying they want to keep some of the territory or won’t give up east Jerusalem, or do a variety of other things? The idea that the Palestinians yearn for peace, are eagerly trying to make some kind of agreement, but are only stopped by Israeli intransigence seems completely self-evident to the point that any challenge of this idea is ridiculed, ignored, or treated as some kind of dishonest manipulation. 

People think that when they’ve made these points it constitutes some kind of devastating, unanswerable rebuttal proving why there is no peace and why Israel is responsible. In fact, these statements are all either long outdated or simply beside the point. 

In addition, many of the things said are factually wrong. Israel has neither constructed new settlements nor expanded their boundaries for fifteen years. But for the moment let’s leave aside the factual issues. It is easy to show that these claims are inaccurate but either ears are shut or the columns of the publications are closed to such responses.

Still, nothing could be simpler than to answer these claims.

Here’s the answer:

If the Palestinians are so miserable, they feel their situation  intolerable, and want to get rid of settlements, they have and have had a very simple solution. Drum roll, please:

Make peace as fast as possible in a way that settles almost all their ostensible claims.

Yet they have refused to do so on numerous occasions going back for decades. In fact, this is the thirtieth anniversary of the Egypt-Israel agreement at Camp David which first opened the door to a Palestinian state. Then there was the Reagan plan and U.S.-PLO dialogue of the 1980s, followed by the peace process of the 1990s, the Camp David 2 and President Bill Clinton offers of 2000, and most recently the offer of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert (who was absolutely desperate for a deal in order to save his political career) and most recently the Israeli cabinet’s peace plan in which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu explicitly agreed to accept a Palestinian state.

If the Palestinians made a deal they would get an independent state with its capital in east Jerusalem. They would enjoy tremendous sympathy in the West to help them get the best possible terms. What wouldn’t they get? They’d have to swap, say, three or four percent of the West Bank’s territory in exchange for an equal amount of Israeli land and they wouldn’t get all of east Jerusalem.

That’s about it. Oh, and they’d also get many billions of dollars in compensation.

What else would they have to give up? They’d have to agree that a peace treaty ended the conflict, which makes sense. They’d have to resettle Palestinian refugees in Palestine, which also makes sense. They might well have to accept security guarantees for Israel and some limits on their own armaments. But, okay, they could bargain on that and get the best deal possible.

Again, though, there would be no Jewish settlements on Palestinian state soil, though some would become part of Israel due to the land swaps.

Note that right now the Palestinian Authority is refusing to negotiate at all, nominally because Israel is building a few apartments in Jerusalem. So what? That should be an incentive to negotiate faster so that the construction doesn’t go on and on, becoming ever more irreversible.

The purpose of negotiations is to offer compromises in order to get things you want. It is suspicious for a side to say that they are the desperate, suffering underdog eager for peace to say: We won’t even come to the table unless we know beforehand we’ll get everything we want and we won’t make peace unless we get 100 percent of our demands. 95 percent? We’d rather go on fighting for decades.

Why is it so hard for people to understand these basic points? Of course, they have been misinformed and nobody’s pointed these things out to them. To some extent, the demonization of Israel has distorted their comprehension.

But the truly fundamental problem is that understanding that the solution for the Palestinians is to make a peace agreement-and that Israel isn’t blocking this outcome-is that it leaves them with a paradox for their minds to resolve: 

Why if the Palestinians are suffering so much won’t they make peace?

Here’s the answer: the Palestinian leadership wants total victory and Israel’s elimination. They are willing to go on letting their people suffer for a century in pursuit of that goal. They hope that the world will give them everything they want without their having to make any concessions. They realize that saying “no” and letting the conflict continue gives them more-not less-leverage internationally because they make Israel look like the guilty party and think, consequently, it is being punished in European policies and public opinion.

So the arguments being made by Westerners who think they are being sympathetic to a suffering people just don’t make sense. In fact, they make things worse. Indeed, they are part of a Palestinian strategy to avoid making peace and encourage such intransigence.

Again, the calculation goes something like this: the longer the Palestinians refuse to make a compromise peace, the more people will blame Israel, turn away from it, and pressure it into unilateral concessions. This is a masochistic-based approach, a willingness to suffer in exchange for gain, and a gain that partly comes from many onlookers’ inability to believe that anyone could use such tactics.

And yet the truth is right out in the open. Don’t like settlements? Don’t like “occupation.” Then make peace and get rid of these things. The continued existence of settlements or of any Israeli military presence due to the Palestinian continuation of the conflict doesn’t prove anything to the contrary.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict, and Crisis (Palgrave Macmillan), Conflict and Insurgency in the Contemporary Middle East (Routledge), The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition) (Viking-Penguin), the paperback edition of The Truth About Syria(Palgrave-Macmillan), A Chronological History of Terrorism (Sharpe), and The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley).

Britain’s Top Military Chaplain Says We Must Recognize the Good Things about the Afghan Taliban

There are several reasons why Muslims become involved in criminal acts with “religious” overtones, but the bottom line is, they commit murders and other crimes and their eventual goal is to institute a type of oppression similar to the brutal Taliban model.

So, although we can have sympathy for young people brainwashed by Mullahs and Imams, we need to be realistic as well, as pointed out here by Professor Rubin.

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By Barry Rubin

We’re getting used to it by now, the bizarre inability to recognize evil, the cultural relativism that excuses real political and war crimes, and the lack of faith by Westerners in their own civilization and religion. Yet each strange juxtapositions never fail to shock those who still remember the way things are supposed to be, and must be if the forces of dictatorship and repression are going to be beaten.

Sound too strong? Consider this new development. The Anglican Church’s chief chaplain with the British army is praising the Afghani Taliban. The UK foreign minister just wants to make a deal with some of these collaborators with al-Qaida who enabled the September 11 attack and are among the world’s leading totalitarians.

The Right Reverend Stephen Venner, recently appointed by  Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams– who himself favors Muslims in the UK living under Islamic Sharia law–said that while some of the Taliban’s methods are unacceptable, it is unhelpful to paint them as too evil in what is really “a very complex situation.”

It isn’t helpful to demonize Venner by exaggerating what he meant. Venner is not being an apologist for everything the Taliban has done nor does he want them to take over Afghanistan. Nevertheless, his misunderstanding reflects the dangerous incomprehension all too common in the West. What he really wants to do is to win over elements in the Taliban by being nice to them, then getting them to participate in creating a stable, moderate Afghanistan. That’s just about the same thing as British government policy and perhaps U.S. government policy.

But here’s where the problems begin. Of course, in the Taliban as in other radical movements—including fascism and Communism—there are people who get caught up for personal or local reasons who might well break away under such conditions.

Yet those conditions are not the movement’s enemies being nice to it. There are two ways such a “break away” can happen. First, they can realize that the movement to which they have dedicated and even risked their lives is bad. Or they can conclude that it is being defeated and it’s time to change sides. This principle applies as well to al-Qaida, Muslim Brotherhoods, Hamas, Hizballah, the Iranian and Syrian regimes, as well as many other such ideologies and movements.

The problem with the Venner approach is by spreading a veneer of respectability about vicious tyrannical terrorists, it flatters rather than exposes and breaks their ideology. At the same time, making generous offers of forgiveness and participation assures them that they aren’t going to be defeated. In other words, the venerable Venners of the world ensure that the Taliban’s supporters will stick with the group or, even worse, help them get into power.

Regarding the flattery aspect, Venner quickly starts talking about the “good” side of the Taliban:

“There’s a large number of things that the Taliban say and stand for which none of us in the West could approve, but simply to say therefore that everything they do is bad is not helping the situation because it’s not honest really. The Taliban can perhaps be admired for their conviction to their faith and their sense of loyalty to each other.”

But a group like the Taliban isn’t just a mix of nice and nasty things but rather a holistic ideology about the will of the deity, the nature of life, and the proper direction for society. People like Venner—quite numerous among Western clergy, academics, journalists, and politicians—simply cannot understand such an approach because they no longer believe in a coherent doctrine of their own.

Let’s put it bluntly: They want to kill you. If possible they would destroy your liberties and way of life but more likely they will just settle for bloody oppression of their own people.

The UK government’s line, which the U.S. government is hinting at accepting, is that the Taliban or at least what are called “moderate elements” in it must be brought into Afghanistan’s government. Foreign Minister David Miliband wants to buy them off with the promise that they will sit in the Afghan parliament in future.

Let me explain it to you: Do you think of Taliban types went into the government they would be transformed into nice moderate guys who just want to have peace and get along with everyone?

Again, if someone were to defect and turn against the Taliban then of course they could change sides. But the idea of bringing radical Islamists into government and then expect stability or moderation is quite foolish as they will still be compelled to seize state power, transform their societies into something even worse, and make war on the West.

Colonel Richard Kemp, who served in Afghanistan and retains a sense of reality, explained things that should be too obvious to need explanation, regarding this naiveté:

“Their central creed and ethos is about violent oppression which comes from a politics of extreme religion that has very little to commend it in terms that we would recognize or appreciate. In many ways it is a mistake to compare their faith of extreme holy war with the kind of religion of peace and understanding that the bishop follows. They certainly wouldn’t show understanding of his faith.”

In fact, they’d call him a Crusader and cut off his head.

One might add to that massacres; amputations; terrorism; a genocidal hatred toward the West, Christians, and Jews; and the reduction of women to slavery.

People used to make fun of those fooled by Communism or the Nazis but in many circles such lessons have been forgotten. Ironically the apologists for the world’s most reactionary and tyrannical forces are usually found among people who consider themselves progressives. The same people are often notoriously less empathetic when it comes to the United States or Israel, in whom they often appear to see far less good than in Islamist extremists.

Yet the West’s problem today is not that it is too unsympathetic to its enemies and too assertive about its own beliefs. Quite the contrary.

Update: Bishop Venner later apologized for his comment, saying it was ”one small phrase in quite a long interview” intended to suggest that not all members of the Taliban were ”equally evil.” Actually, in some ways that’s formulation is even worse since if they were less evil this presumably means they didn’t actually go around killing and oppressing people. But for that to be true they’d have to be pretty low-level and inactive, meaning they wouldn’t be very important. But Venner envisions these people participating in the Afghan government. So I suppose that would apply if they signed the membership list at the meeting, didn’t actually do anything, but are somehow important enough to be leaders of Afghanistan.

Happy Chanukah - Adam Sandler original Chanukah (Hanukkah) Song

On Israel’s Construction Freeze: U.S. Fails to Deliver: Instead of Praising, Europe Demands More

By Barry Rubin

Israel acceded to a U.S. request to freeze construction on existing Jewish settlements; the Palestinian Authority (PA) refuses even to negotiate or to give anything in exchange for this concession. Who did Europe reward and was the United States able to mobilize praise for the former or criticism for the latter?

Need you ask?

It is now confirmed that my analysis of the State Department statement on the construction freeze was correct. It was intended as a statement supporting key Israeli demands-recognition of Israel as a Jewish state and changes in the 1967 borders-while also meeting major Palestinian demands, an independent state based on those borders.

Equally unnoticed, however, is the fact that the United States did not even get its European allies to endorse its new position. Once again, despite all the Obama Administration’s apologies, flattery, and concessions, it could not even obtain the smallest things in exchange from those given such rewards.

The main U.S. effort was to get the Quartet of mediators (U.S., Europe Union, Russia, and UN) to endorse the new U.S. stance. The proposed statement would have urged resumed negotiations without preconditions to seek an agreement which:

“would fulfill the Palestinian goal of establishing an independent, viable state, based on the 1967 borders, agreed upon exchanges [of territory], and the Israeli goal of a Jewish state with secure and recognized borders that reflect the developments [which occurred on the ground] and which fulfill the Israeli security requirements.”

Reportedly, the Russians rejected the Jewish state and reflecting developments on the ground positions. This explains why the Quartet couldn’t issue a statement. But why didn’t the United States obtain the same statement from the European Union alone?

Instead, after making still another unilateral concession, Israel now has to fight off a hostile EU resolution calling for east Jerusalem to be capital of a Palestinian state without any mention of Israeli goals, including  mention of west Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, an easy way of making the resolution more even-handed.

So once again Israel is given the message, here reinforced by inept U.S. diplomacy, that the reward for making a concession are demands to make more concessions. This is not, however, to underestimate the importance of the new U.S. position as expressed in Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s statement. The question, of course, is how long and whether the Obama Administration will stick to its new set of promises.

All Pain, No Gain In Israeli Settlement Freeze

Thanks to the Jerusalem Post

Let’s tally the diplomatic benefits that have accrued to Israel since Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s November 25 announcement of a 10-month moratorium on new settlement construction. That statement followed tardily on his June 14 address at Bar-Ilan University formally accepting the creation of a demilitarized “Palestine” as the endgame to negotiations.

The Gush Etzion town of Efrat.
Photo: Ariel Jerozolimski

Since the freeze was announced, US Special Envoy George Mitchell has managed to contain his enthusiasm. While acknowledging that Netanyahu has gone further than any previous Israeli leader, Mitchell could bring himself to say only that he wants to see permanent status negotiations resume “as soon as possible.”

To which Mahmoud Abbas essentially responded: “I don’t think so.”

In an interview with a Washington-based think tank, Mitchell did at least reiterate Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s recent statement that negotiations should be “based on the 1967 lines with agreed swaps.”

This is significant, because the Obama administration had previously been seen to be backing away from George W. Bush’s April 2004 letter to prime minister Ariel Sharon, in which the former president said a negotiated outcome would have to be based on a 1967-plus formula.

Unfortunately, in an extraordinary tactical blunder, Netanyahu allowed consensus settlement blocs to be included in his freeze.

THE administration’s minimalist response to Netanyahu’s two historic announcements, along with its failure to persuade Arab governments to take steps toward normalization with Israel and demonstrate that the Arab Peace Initiative is not simply a propaganda ploy, can only make one wonder where this freeze is going to lead.

If it means so little to the White House and nothing to the Palestinians – if it is, moreover, not part of some larger coherent strategy in which Netanyahu enunciates what Israel’s boundaries ought to be – and if the moratorium’s gut-wrenching impact domestically is all pain and no gain, what are its benefits?

Indeed, a Swedish EU initiative “takes note” of Netanyahu’s freeze by proposing to sanctify the Palestinian position on Jerusalem as Europe’s own policy.

It’s bad enough that Europe rejects Israeli sovereignty over west Jerusalem on the grounds that it does not want to prejudge a negotiated outcome. But to watch Sweden (which is finishing its tenure as rotating president of the EU) push so hard to acknowledge east Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine, even as Abbas refuses to negotiate, is profoundly demoralizing to an Israeli mainstream which genuinely seeks accommodation with the Palestinians.

Evidently, it’s politically easier for elements in the EU to parrot PLO demands, rather than support an equitable solution that also takes Jewish sensibilities into account.

Of course, Abbas’s demand for a settlement freeze is patently bogus in the first place. A prospective peace deal would permanently resolve the issue of where Jewish rights could be exercised and which settlements would be uprooted. So why are we arguing about a freeze when we should be negotiating borders?

The real reason Abbas does not want to talk is because he hopes that by hanging tough, an exasperated Washington will impose the Fatah position on Israel. On top of that, he does not want to appear conciliatory when Hamas’s fortunes are on the rise.

It doesn’t help that Netanyahu is placing Abbas in an untenable position. The PLO, which ostensibly eschews armed struggle, has been demanding the release en masse of Palestinian prisoners since 1993. To which Israel has responded in dribs and drabs under the rubric of “helping Abu Mazen.”

Yet by taking a single IDF soldier captive and by adhering to its original demands for three years, Hamas is on the threshold of achieving the release of 1,000 terrorists, including the vilest in the Israeli prison system. The popularity of the Islamists will skyrocket; Fatah’s will nosedive.

To add insult to injury, Netanyahu is reportedly toying with freeing Marwan Barghouti, whose arrival in Ramallah would be one big headache for Abbas and hasten a rapprochement between Fatah and Hamas at the expense of both Israel and Abbas. No wonder the rais is sulking.

So Netanyahu’s US-pressed freeze has pitted settlers against soldiers. It hasn’t swayed Abbas or the Arab League. Hamas is bemused. Europe is little impressed.

The Obama administration, which so far has merely offered parsimonious praise, needs to do better.